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Imagine a situation where a company produces electronic
goods. In the beginning of 2013, the company releases an
electronic widget as its new marquee product. While this widget
is revolutionary, it also has some significant safety problems.
Soon after the release, the electronic widget begins to catch fire
during use. The company did not know of the safety problems
when it first released the product. Since the safety problems
have arisen, the company’s stock price has dropped significantly.
Shortly after the stock price began to decline, the CEO released
press statements touting that they considered safety their
primary goal and that they had fixed any defects in the electronic
widget.
While the company was making these statements,
government regulatory agencies were doing their own
investigation. They found that the testing procedures the
company employed were not adequate, and there was still a
significant risk that these new products were dangerous.
Moreover, the manufacturer circulated an internal memorandum
that stated that the company still did not know the exact reason
why the initial model would catch on fire, and the company was
unsure of how to proceed.
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After the company made statements claiming to have fixed
the defect, the stock price began to rebound. However, soon
after, the same problems began to arise in the devices that the
company claimed to have fixed. With such significant problems
in its marquee product, the stock price, once again, plummeted.
A stockholder brought a claim under Rule 10b-5 of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, claiming that the company
misrepresented the safety of the electronic widget. Plaintiffstockholders, however, at this stage of the litigation have a very
limited amount of information. The plaintiffs know there was a
government investigation, but do not know who the report was
sent to or who was aware of the investigation. Furthermore, they
know that there was an internal memorandum, but they do not
know who within the company had access to it. Can the plaintiff
shareholders adequately plead that the corporation acted with
scienter without identifying specific individuals within the
company who knew of the reports?
Scenario B:

Scenario C:
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Alternatively, consider if Corporation B had two offices, one
in New York and one in China. The New York office is the
corporate headquarters. The CEO, stationed in the New York
office, makes a statement about the safety of the new electronic
widgets. A corporate official in the China office, which also
houses the manufacturing plant, knows that the statement is
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Assume there is a company, distinct from the company of
Scenario A, called Company B. Company B is experiencing the
same problems as Company A. Company B released a new
marquee electronic widget, which experienced severe safety
problems. Company B, however, genuinely believed that it had
fixed the problem. The CEO of the company made a statement
affirmatively endorsing the product’s safety. The CEO believes
the statement he is making is true. The janitor, however, a
former electrical engineer who has been cleaning up around the
manufacturing plant, has realized that defects still exist in the
product. Can the misstatement by the CEO be paired with the
janitor’s knowledge of the statement’s falsity in order to
sufficiently plead corporate liability for fraud?
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false. Can the misstatement by the CEO in New York be paired
with the corporate official’s knowledge in China to adequately
plead corporate liability for fraud?
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1
See, e.g., Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353,
366 (5th Cir. 2004).
2
See Michael A. Perino, Did the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act Work?,
2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 913, 914 (2003).
3
Southland Sec. Corp., 365 F.3d at 366 (rejecting the use of collective scienter
as inconsistent with common law fraud principles).
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The issue with these hypotheticals is in determining whether
plaintiffs can successfully plead a strong inference of scienter,
under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
against the corporation without being able to plead that any
specific individual within the corporation had scienter.
Traditionally, a plaintiff can successfully plead that a corporation
has scienter when the scienter of an individual within the
company can be imputed to the corporation.1 Recently, however,
alternate theories have arisen to impute scienter to a corporation
without inculpating an individual employee. One of them is
collective scienter, which is the subject of this Note.
This Note argues that the correct approach to imputing
scienter to a corporation by means of the collective scienter
theory is through the absurdity analysis taken by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Part I of this
Note reviews the Securities Exchange Act, which gave rise to the
private right of action in securities fraud litigation. Part I also
discusses United States Supreme Court jurisprudence on the
private right of action. Furthermore, Part I lays out the
framework of Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”). PSLRA enacted a variety of procedural reforms in
securities litigation in an attempt to curb frivolous litigation.2
Part I focuses on the changes that PSLRA caused in securities
litigation and the congressional intent behind those changes.
Part II examines the current split of authority among the
United States Courts of Appeals for the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh
Circuits over the extent, if any, that collective scienter should be
used in pleading that a corporation has scienter. One approach
is that of the Fifth Circuit, which considers collective scienter to
contradict common law fraud principles.3 The only way to
impute liability to a corporation is to look at the required state of
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Id.
Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015, 1018 (11th Cir. 2004)
(holding that collective scienter did not satisfy the particularity requirement of
PSLRA).
6
City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 685 (6th
Cir. 2005) (allowing plaintiffs to use a theory of collective scienter to satisfy the
pleading requirements of the PSLRA).
7
Id.
8
See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir.
2008).
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
One reform of PSLRA was to halt discovery during a motion to dismiss.
Therefore, plaintiffs only have the tools at hand available to them when alleging
scienter.
12
See infra Part I.B.
5
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mind of an individual corporate official.4 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit takes a similar
approach, holding that collective scienter is not consistent with
PSLRA’s requirement that scienter be pled with particularity.5
Conversely, the Sixth Circuit has adopted a theory of
collective scienter.6
It allows plaintiffs to plead that the
corporation has scienter by pairing the statements of the
company to an individual who knew the statements were false,
even though it was not the same person who made the
statements.7
The last approach, developed by the Seventh Circuit, has
been called the “absurdity analysis.”8 This analysis allows for a
limited version of collective scienter.9 Under this analysis, a
complaint can adequately plead scienter on the part of the
corporation without imputing it to a specific individual if the
statement made by the corporation is so dramatic that a
corporate official must have known it was false.10
Finally, Part III argues that the correct standard for
permitting collective scienter is the one presented by the Seventh
Circuit. While many of the purer forms of collective scienter are
problematic under the heightened pleading standards enacted by
PSLRA, an all-out ban on collective scienter disregards the
practical difficulties in being able to effectively impute scienter
prior to discovery.11
The Seventh Circuit’s approach is consistent with Congress’s
intent in enacting PSLRA and the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence with regard to securities litigation.12 Furthermore,
it is consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs, Inc.
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v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.13 In Tellabs, the Court reiterated
the heightened pleading standard for scienter required to survive
a motion to dismiss.14 The Seventh Circuit’s approach maintains
this heightened pleading standard that both the Supreme Court
and Congress have unequivocally sustained. Moreover, the
Seventh Circuit’s approach allows courts to take a common sense
perspective in the scienter analysis.15
I.
A.

THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Securities Exchange Act of 1934

In the wake of the Great Depression, Congress enacted the
The
Securities Exchange Act of 193416 (“Exchange Act”).
Exchange Act was intended to be a method of regulating the
trade of securities in order to protect investors from fraud.17 To
fulfill its congressional mandate, the Exchange Act created the
Securities Exchange Commission18 (“SEC”). The SEC was given
broad authority to regulate the securities industry, including the
ability to promulgate rules under the Exchange Act.19 Rule 10b-5
13

551 U.S. 308 (2007); see infra Part I.C.
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324.
15
See S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In
assessing the allegations holistically as required by Tellabs, the federal courts
certainly need not close their eyes to circumstances that are probative of scienter
viewed with a practical and common-sense perspective.”).
16
15 U.S.C. § 78j (2012).
17
See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) (“The 1934 Act was
intended principally to protect investors against manipulation of stock prices
through regulation of transactions upon securities exchanges and in over-thecounter markets, and to impose regular reporting requirements on companies whose
stock is listed on national securities exchanges.”); see also Blue Chip Stamps v.
Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975) (“The Securities Exchange Act of
1943 . . . provide[d] for the regulation of securities exchanges . . . to prevent
inequitable and unfair practices on such exchanges and markets . . . .”); Browning
Jeffries, The Implications of Janus on Issuer Liability in Jurisdictions Rejecting
Collective Scienter, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 491, 498 (2013).
18
See Jeffries, supra note 17; The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry,
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, http://www.sec.gov/about/laws.shtml#secact1933 (last
modified Oct. 1, 2013).
19
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”) gave the SEC broad
powers including the power to register, regulate, and oversee brokerage firms,
transfer agents, and clearing agents. The SEC was given the power to regulate
various securities exchanges including the New York Stock Exchange and the
NASDAQ. Furthermore, the Exchange Act gives the SEC disciplinary powers over
certain types of conduct that the Exchange Act prohibits such as fraud and deceptive
practices. See The Laws That Govern the Securities Industry, supra note 18.
14
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of the Exchange Act, promulgated in 1948, is a “broad antifraud
provision that essentially prohibits all fraud in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities.”20 Rule 10b-5 makes it
unlawful “[t]o use or employ, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors.”21 Rule 10b-5
was a hastily created and broadly defined rule.22 Because of this
broad definition, Rule 10b-5 has grown exponentially through
judicial activism. As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated, “a judicial
oak . . . has grown from little more than a legislative acorn.”23
Among the regulatory powers that the Exchange Act granted
the SEC was the power to bring enforcement actions against
violators of section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.24 While the rule does
not mention any private right of action for violations of the
provisions, district courts began to recognize an implied private
right of action early on.25 The Supreme Court, two decades
following the implementation of the act, confirmed this private
right of action.26
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20
Justin Marocco, When Will It Finally End: The Effectiveness of the Rule 10b-5
Private Action as a Fraud-Deterrence Mechanism Post-Janus, 73 LA. L. REV. 633, 633
(2013).
21
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (implementing section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
22
Marocco, supra note 20 (“I wasted no time; I got some people in, we drafted a
rule, we presented it to the Commission, and, without any hesitation, the
Commission tossed the paper on the table saying they were in favor of it. One
Commission member said, ‘Well, we’re against fraud, aren’t we?’ So, before the sun
was down, we had the rule that is now Rule 10b-5” (quoting Milton V. Freeman,
Colloquium Foreword, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. S1, S1–S2 (1993))).
23
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 737 (1975).
24
See supra note 19 (describing the regulatory powers of the SEC).
25
See Jeffries, supra note 17, at 499 (describing the jurisprudence leading to the
recognition of the private right of action); see, e.g., Kardon v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 69 F.
Supp. 512, 514 (E.D. Pa. 1946) (recognizing an implied private right of action in the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934).
26
See Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 12 (1971)
(“Hence we do not read § 10(b) as narrowly as the Court of Appeals; it is not ‘limited
to preserving the integrity of the securities markets,’ though that purpose is
included. Section 10(b) must be read flexibly, not technically and restrictively. Since
there was a ‘sale’ of a security and since fraud was used ‘in connection with’ it, there
is redress under § 10(b), whatever might be available as a remedy under state law.”
(quoting Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 430 F.2d 355, 361 (2d
Cir. 1970))); see also Jeffries, supra note 17, at 499.
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For a private litigant to establish a Rule 10b-5 claim, the
plaintiff must prove (a) a material misrepresentation or omission
made by the defendant, (b) a connection between the
misrepresentation or omission and purchase or sale of a security,
(c) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission, (d) economic
loss, (e) loss causation, and (f) scienter.27 Satisfying the scienter
element is the focus of this Note.
B.

The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”)

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

27
Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157
(2008).
28
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730–31; see also Patrick Berarducci &, Larry J. Obhof, Supreme
Court Clarifies Scienter Pleadings, 17 BUS. L. TODAY, Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 10.
29
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730–31
(noting that many security suits targeted deep pocket defendants without regard to
their actual culpability).
30
MICHAEL A. PERINO, SECURITIES LITIGATION UNDER THE PSLRA § 1.01(A), at
1-10–11 (2012).
31
See Berarducci & Obhof, supra note 28.
32
Id. (describing many of the costs of frivolous securities litigation including the
frustration of normal business activities along with expensive litigation).
33
H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31–32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730–31
(“The private securities litigation system is too important to the integrity of
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Congress has also made it increasingly difficult for private
individuals to bring private securities claims. Congress was
concerned that an unchecked private right of action could lead to
a host of frivolous actions which would undermine the capital
markets and harm the entire economy.28 Therefore, in 1995,
Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act
(“PSLRA”).
Congressional reports prior to the enactment of the PSLRA
clearly demonstrate the concerns that Congress had with an
unchecked private right of action.29 Left unchecked, private
rights actions can lead to frivolous suits and also impose
substantial burdens on law abiding companies.30
These
“nuisance filings” were forcing innocent companies to pay either
exorbitant attorney fees or even larger settlements.31 This, in
turn, harms investors, “the very people that securities actions are
supposed to protect.”32
At the same time, however, Congress also recognized the
importance that private rights of action played in enforcing
federal securities litigation.33 Along with SEC civil and criminal
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enforcement actions, the private right of action is an effective tool
in enforcing federal securities litigation.34 The private right of
action provides investors with an independent avenue of redress
without relying on federal authorities such as the SEC to take
action.35 Furthermore, the private right of action enhances
confidence in the capital markets by offering another element of
deterrence to corporate officers before perpetrating a fraud.36
PSLRA attempted to balance these two opposing goals when
overhauling the procedural requirements for bringing a
securities fraud claim.37 PSLRA was intended to address a
variety of problems with securities litigation by instituting
“procedural hurdles” to dissuade nonmeritorious litigation.38
PSLRA substantially altered securities litigation with one
principle change being the pleading standards.39 PSLRA enacted
a heightened pleading standard for plaintiffs claiming securities
fraud.40
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American capital markets to allow this system to be undermined by those who seek
to line their own pockets by bringing abusive and meritless suits. Private securities
litigation is an indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their
losses without having to rely upon government action. Such private lawsuits
promote public and global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter
wrongdoing and to guarantee that corporate officers, auditors, directors, lawyers and
others properly perform their jobs. This legislation seeks to return the securities
litigation system to that high standard.”).
34
See id. at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730; PERINO, supra note 30,
at 1-6–7 (“Congress expressly adopted the view long espoused by courts, the SEC,
and plaintiff’s class action attorneys that ‘[p]rivate securities litigation is an
indispensable tool with which defrauded investors can recover their losses without
having to rely upon government action.’ ” (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted));
see also, Berarducci & Obhof, supra note 28. (recognizing the importance of the
private right of action in deterring fraud and other violations).
35
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-369, at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730.
36
See id.
37
PERINO, supra note 30, at 1-6 (“Congress viewed itself as walking a fine line
between promoting confidence in the fairness of the litigation system and promoting
confidence in the fairness of the capital markets.”).
38
See Perino, supra note 2 (stating one of Congress’s primary goals as reducing
the costs that securities class actions impose on the capital markets by discourage
the filing of nonmeritorious suits); see also Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights,
Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 320 (2007).
39
Other changes included procedures for appointment of lead plaintiffs and lead
counsel, limitations on damages and attorney fees, a statutory safe harbor for
forward looking statements, a stay of discovery pending a motion to dismiss, and
mandatory sanctions for frivolous lawsuits. Berarducci & Obhof, supra note 28.
40
See 15 U.S.C § 78u-4(b)(1)(B) (2012).
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Before PSLRA, plaintiffs were required to plead fraud in
accordance with Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Rule 9(b) requires plaintiffs to plead the facts with
PSLRA raised that standard by requiring
particularity.41
plaintiffs to plead falsity and scienter with particularity.42
PSLRA first requires that each allegedly false or misleading
statement must be pled “with particularity.”43 Second, it requires
that a complaint must “state with particularity facts giving rise
to a strong inference that the defendant acted with the required
state of mind.”44 A strong inference has been defined as one that
a reasonable person would deem cogent and at least as
compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the
facts alleged.45
This heightened pleading standard has made it difficult for
plaintiffs to ever reach the discovery stage.46 Therefore, in order
to satisfy these pleading requirements, a variety of pleading
theories have arisen.47 One such theory is collective scienter.
C.

Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Private Rights of Action

41

C M
Y K
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FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b).
15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b).
43
§ 78u-4(b)(1).
44
§ 78u-4(b)(2)(A).
45
See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
46
See Heather F. Crow, Riding the Fence on Collective Scienter: Allowing
Plaintiffs To Clear the PSLRA Pleading Hurdle, 71 LA. L. REV. 313, 320 (2010).
47
See generally PERINO, supra note 30.
48
511 U.S. 164 (1994).
49
David J. Baum, The Aftermath of Central Bank of Denver: Private Aiding and
Abetting Liability Under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1817,
1822–24 (1995) (documenting the rise of aiding and abetting liability prior to the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Central Bank).
42

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 280 Side A

The Supreme Court, beginning in the early 1990s, decided a
series of cases that drastically rolled back the effectiveness of the
private right of action.
Along with the aforementioned
congressional legislation the ability of private investors to
succeed in bringing causes of action under Rule 10b-5 has been
seriously curtailed.
In Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of
Denver,48 the Supreme Court took the first swing of the axe at the
“judicial oak.” Following the promulgation of Rule 10b-5, lower
courts interpreted the rule liberally, allowing plaintiffs to pursue
both primary and secondary actors.49 Plaintiffs were able to
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succeed against a defendant who, while not the primary violator,
was engaged in preparation or other activity that helped the
primary violators perpetrate the fraud;50 this was known as
aiding and abetting liability.51 From the enactment of the
Rule10b-5 until 1994, every federal circuit court agreed that
plaintiffs were able to succeed against secondary violators in this
way.52 Because of this, private plaintiffs were able to successfully
assert claims against a variety of secondary actors, including
lawyers and accountants.53
In 1994, the Supreme Court overruled thirty years of
precedent by holding that private litigants could not utilize an
aiding and abetting theory of liability under section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5.54 The Court strictly interpreted the language of
section 10(b) to find that private causes of action do not impose
aiding-and-abetting liability.55 While the Court did not rule on
aiding and abetting liability with regards to SEC enforcement
actions, Congress took the steps to expressly authorize SEC
enforcement actions for aiding and abetting liability.56 Notably,
Congress did not extend aider and abettor liability to the private
right of action.57
Following the Court’s ruling in Central Bank, the circuit
courts adopted various methods for imputing secondary actor
liability without using aiding and abetting violations as the
foundation of the claim. One such standard was known as
“scheme liability.”58 Scheme liability uses Rule 10b-5(a) and (c)

C M
Y K
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Id.
See Jeffries, supra note 17, at 500.
52
See id. at 499–500; see also Baum, supra note 49, at 1824 n.47 (listing the
circuit cases that have upheld aider and abettor liability).
53
Baum, supra note 49, at 1819.
54
See Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511
U.S. 164, 177–78 (1994) (holding that since the statute does not provide for aiding
and abetting liability, the Court “cannot amend the statute to create liability for acts
that are not themselves manipulative or deceptive within the meaning of the
statute.”); see also Baum, supra note 49, at 1835.
55
Cent. Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. at 177–78.
56
See 15 U.S.C. § 78t(e) (2012) (“[A]ny person that knowingly or recklessly
provides substantial assistance to another person . . . shall be deemed to be in
violation of such provision to the same extent as the person to whom such assistance
is provided.”).
57
See Jeffries, supra note 17, at 501. Congress, in section 20(e) of the Exchange
Act, expressly authorized the SEC to bring enforcement actions based on aiding and
abetting liability; however Congress did not extend the same protection to private
litigants.
58
Id. at 502.
51
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instead of Rule 10b-5(b).59 Using these two sections, plaintiffs
had found a loophole to get around the Court’s ruling in Central
Bank.60 Courts would find defendants liable as part of a
fraudulent scheme, as long as the scheme encompassed conduct
beyond a misrepresentation or omission.61 This began a broad
interpretation of scheme liability which incorporated many
secondary actors into the liability fold.
However, once again, as the judicial oak began to grow, the
Supreme Court stepped in to prune it. In Stoneridge Investment
Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,62 the Court narrowed
the application of scheme liability by focusing on the reliance
element of Rule 10b-5.63 The Court held that the plaintiff failed
to establish the element of reliance in its Rule 10b-5 claim.64 The
Court stated the secondary actors had no duty to disclose and no
member of the investing public had knowledge of the deceptive
acts.65 Therefore, to use scheme liability to impute liability to the
secondary actors was an “indirect chain,” which the Court found
“too remote for liability.”66
While the Court narrowed down a formerly expansive
interpretation of scheme liability, it did not extinguish scheme
liability entirely. In Stoneridge, as is mentioned above, the Court
issued a narrow holding which focused only on the issue of
reliance.67 The holding did not speak to the larger issue of
whether the defendant has to actually make the statement to be
held liable. The Court explicitly said that the rejection of scheme
liability does not necessarily make all secondary actors immune

04/08/2016 13:04:55
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59
Under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c), defendants who use a “device, scheme, or artifice
to defraud” may be liable for securities fraud. After Central Bank, plaintiffs began
using these sections to inculpate secondary actors for misrepresentations made by
primary violators of § 10b. In doing so, they created a type of aider and abettor
liability outside of Rule 10b-5(b), which the Court struck down in Central Bank. See
BRENT A. OLSON, 2 PUBLICLY TRADED CORPORATIONS: GOVERNANCE & REG. § 11:9
(2015).
60
See Marocco, supra note 20, at 640.
61
See OLSON, supra note 59. Under Rule 10b-5(a) or (c) there must be an
inherently deceptive act that is distinct from an alleged misstatement. A claim
under “scheme liability” cannot be made where the only claim alleged is
misrepresentation or omission.
62
552 U.S. 148 (2008).
63
Id. at 159.
64
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
65
Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 159.
66
Id.
67
Id.
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from private suit.68 The Court reiterated the holding of Central
Bank, that the private right of action covers secondary actors
who commit primary violations.69
The Supreme Court altered the securities litigation
landscape once again in 2007 with Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues
& Rights, Ltd.70 Prior to the Supreme Court’s decision, the
circuits were split on what constituted a “strong inference of
scienter” as required by the PSLRA. Specifically, the circuits
were split over what plaintiffs were required to plead to survive a
motion for summary judgment. In Tellabs, the Court defined
what it meant to plead a “strong inference.”71 The Court defined
this as an inference of scienter that is at least as likely as any
plausible opposing inference.72 While the Court adopted a strict
definition of strong inference, the Court did not adopt the
strictest.73 The Court stated that the inference must be more
than merely plausible; it did not require that it was the strongest
inference.74
Along with defining the strong inference of scienter, the
Court also instructed courts to view allegations collectively.75
The Court stated that courts must consider the complaint in its
entirety.76 The question is not whether any individual allegation
meets the strong inference of scienter standard but whether the
allegations collectively raise a strong inference of scienter.77
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Id. at 166.
Id.
70
551 U.S. 308 (2007). See generally Melissa Gilbert, Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor
Issues & Rights, Ltd.—How the Ruling Will Affect Securities Litigation, 3
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 55 (2008) (discussing the potential effects of the Tellabs
decision on securities litigation).
71
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324.
72
Id.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 329. Justice Scalia disagreed with the majority’s definition of “strong
inference” because it did not require the most plausible inference. In his
concurrence, Justice Scalia argued that “the test should be whether the inference of
scienter (if any) is more plausible that the inference of innocence.” This would be the
normal meaning of the phrase “strong inference” that Congress employed. Id.
(Scalia, J., concurring).
75
Id. at 326 (majority opinion).
76
Id.
77
Id.
69
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Finally, the Supreme Court in Janus Capital Group, Inc. v.
First Derivative Traders78 defined what it means to make a
statement under Rule 10b-5.79 The Court narrowly interpreted
the word “maker” for Rule 10b-5 purposes as “the person or
entity with ultimate authority over the statement, including its
content and whether and how to communicate it.”80 The Court
further stated that one who merely prepares a statement for
someone is not its maker.81 In doing so, the Court reaffirmed
that the private right of action should be given a narrow scope.82
In sum, the Supreme Court’s recent history has shown a
trend of narrowing private causes of action and liability in
securities litigation under Rule 10b-5.
The Court has
consistently narrowed whom investors can attempt to attach
liability to and the methods through which investors attempt to
attach liability. It is evident that the Supreme Court is intent on
trimming the judicial oak but is unwilling to completely uproot it.
D. Collective Scienter

78
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131 S. Ct. 2296 (2011).
Id. at 2301.
80
Id. at 2302.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 2303.
83
See Bradley J. Bondi, Dangerous Liaisons: Collective Scienter in SEC
Enforcement Actions, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 1, 3 (2009).
84
Id.
85
Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 743 (9th Cir. 2008).
86
See Kevin M. O’Riordan, Clear Support or Cause for Suspicion? A Critique of
Collective Scienter in Securities Litigation, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1596, 1604 (2007)
(explaining respondeat superior holds an employer liable for an employee’s or
agent’s wrongful acts if those acts are committed within the scope of employment).
79
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It is generally accepted that corporations can act with
scienter when an authorized agent makes a false statement,
knowing that the statement is false.83 Courts have adopted
respondeat superior-type doctrines to impute knowledge from an
agent to the corporation in order to hold the corporation liable for
securities fraud.84 It is universally accepted that the simplest
way to raise an inference of scienter for a corporate defendant is
to plead that an individual defendant, acting as an agent of the
corporation, acted with scienter.85 This method borrows from
common law respondeat superior doctrines and agency
principles.86

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 282 Side B

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_MCCABE

952

3/29/2016 3:03 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:939

87

C M
Y K

04/08/2016 13:04:55

Id. at 1605.
Id. at 1606–07.
89
See Crow, supra note 46 at 314.
90
See MICHAEL J. KAUFMAN, SECURITIES LITIGATION: DAMAGES § 24.55 (2014);
see also Bondi, supra note 83 at 7.
91
See Bondi, supra note 83 at 10.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id. at 12–13.
95
Id.
88
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Courts have disagreed, however, over whether plaintiffs can
raise a strong inference that a corporation has scienter without
pleading scienter to an individual defendant. The theory through
which plaintiffs can raise the strong inference that a corporation
has scienter without inculpating an individual defendant is
known as collective scienter.87 Collective scienter has taken a
variety of forms.88 Generally, collective scienter “permits the
aggregation of one person’s misstatement with the intent of
another in a single pleading in order to attribute an allegation of
scienter to the corporation, rather than pinpoint a single actor
who intentionally misspoke.”89
Collective scienter is often broken down into two categories:
strong and weak collective scienter.90 The strong version allows
plaintiffs to “allege scienter on the part of a corporate defendant
without pleading scienter as to any particular employee.”91 This
is because the corporation is deemed to have a state of mind
completely separate from any of its employees.92 The knowledge
deemed corporate knowledge is “an undifferentiated aggregation
of its employees’ knowledge.”93
The weak version of collective scienter compares the
knowledge of one corporate employee to the statements of
another.94 The weak version allows a plaintiff to successfully
plead corporate scienter if the plaintiff alleges that a member of
management made a false statement when another employee
knew that statement to be false.95 The weak version of collective
scienter allows a plaintiff to mix and match an employee who is
the speaker with an employee who knows the statement was
false. For example, drawing from Scenario B, the weak version
of collective scienter would allow the statements made by the
CEO to be matched with the janitor’s knowledge of the
statement’s falsity to satisfy the scienter standard.
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III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A.

Fifth Circuit Rejects Collective Scienter on Common Law
Fraud Grounds
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Y K
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96
Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th
Cir. 2004).
97
365 F.3d 353.
98
Id. at 360–61.
99
Id.
100
Id. at 366.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Id.
105
Id.
106
Id. at 367.
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The Fifth Circuit has rejected the concept of collective
scienter in its entirety on the ground that it is incompatible with
common law fraud concepts.96 In Southland Securities Corp. v.
INSpire Insurance Solutions Inc.,97 the defendant, INSpire, was a
software service provider that was alleged to have made a variety
of misrepresentations,98 including the release of software with
design flaws and the inflation of earning statements.99
The Fifth Circuit held that, for a plaintiff to raise a strong
inference that a corporation acted with scienter, the court must
“look to the state of mind of the individual corporate official or
officials who make or issue the statement.”100 It is insufficient to
look “generally to the collective knowledge of all the corporation’s
officers and employees acquired in the course of their
employment.”101 The act of making the statement and the state
of mind must intersect with a single individual.102
The court relied on common law fraud concepts to reach its
conclusion.103 In common law fraud actions, the subjective state
of mind must exist in the individual making the misstatement.104
In other words, the person who makes the misstatement must
also be the one who intended to deceive. Therefore, in a Rule
10b-5 action, the misstatement must be made by the same
individual who acted with scienter.105
The plaintiffs in Southland failed to identify any INSpire
director, officer, or employee who acted with scienter in the
making or issuing of any statements.106 Without a collective
scienter theory at the plaintiffs’ disposal, and since the plaintiffs
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could not show any intersection of scienter and misstatement, the
plaintiffs failed to raise a strong inference of scienter on the part
of the corporation.107
B.

Eleventh Circuit Rejects Collective Scienter as Incompatible
with PSLRA

107
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Id. at 367–68.
Phillips v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 374 F.3d 1015, 1017–18 (11th Cir. 2004).
109
See Garfield v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1265 (11th Cir. 2006);
Phillips, 374 F.3d at 1017–18.
110
374 F.3d 1015.
111
Id. at 1017–18.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Id. at 1018 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2) (2012)).
115
Id. at 1017–18.
116
466 F.3d 1255 (11th Cir. 2006).
117
Id. at 1265.
108
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The Eleventh Circuit rejected collective scienter, by
emphasizing its incompatibility with the PSLRA.108 In two
separate cases, the Eleventh Circuit held that scienter must be
In Phillips v.
pled specifically to each defendant.109
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.,110 the court held that scienter must be
found with respect to each defendant and with respect to each
alleged violation of the statute.111 The court relied on the “plain
meaning” of the PSLRA to come to its conclusion.112 The PSLRA
uses the singular term “the defendant” with respect to alleging
scienter.113 It requires that plaintiffs, “with respect to each act or
omission alleged to violate this chapter, state with particularity
facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind.”114 For this reason the court
concluded that scienter must be pled with particularity to each
defendant and that it would be improper to aggregate the
knowledge of several defendants when alleging a strong inference
of scienter.115 Therefore, the court held that pleadings that relied
on collective scienter would not survive summary judgment.
Two years later, the court applied the same reasoning in
Garfield v. NDC Health Corp.,116 to strike down a theory of weak
collective scienter.117 There, the court held that the plaintiffs
failed to plead scienter with sufficient particularity because they
did not allege that the officer who signed a Sarbanes-Oxley
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certificate was the same one who was aware of the financial
misrepresentation.118 The language of the PSLRA precluded the
plaintiffs from utilizing a theory of collective scienter.119
C.

The Sixth Circuit Accepts Collective Scienter

118
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Id. at 1266.
Id.
120
City of Monroe Emps. Ret. Sys. v. Bridgestone Corp., 399 F.3d 651, 685–86
(6th Cir. 2005).
121
399 F.3d 651.
122
Id. at 656–57.
123
Id. at 663–64.
124
Id. at 657.
125
Id. at 658.
126
Id.
127
Id. at 690.
128
Id.at 690–91.
129
Id.
119
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Conversely, the Sixth Circuit has embraced a theory of
collective scienter.120 In City of Monroe Employees Retirement
System v. Bridgestone Corp.,121 Bridgestone, a tire company, had
safety problems with its tires.122 Firestone is a subsidiary of
Bridgestone operating in the United States. Shareholders sued
Bridgestone
and
Firestone,
alleging
several
public
misrepresentations about the safety and performance of their
tires.123 Firestone was well aware of many of the safety problems
because of internal reports that demonstrated the tires’ safety
problems.124 Other evidence that the defendants were aware of
the defects in their products included a settlement with an
insurance company.125 Venezuela and the State of Arizona,
furthermore, had both notified Firestone of issues they were
having with the tires.126
While Firestone was aware of all this information, the CEO
of the company had never made any statements concerning the
safety of the tires.127 Therefore, the plaintiffs could not match the
statements to anyone with knowledge of their falsity. The court,
however, permitted the plaintiffs to plead a theory of collective
scienter.128 The plaintiffs aggregated the misleading corporate
statements with the knowledge of the CEO and the pleading
survived the motion to dismiss.129
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D. The Supreme Court Clarifies the Scienter Standard—Tellabs
v. Makor Issues & Rights

130
131
132
133
134
135

137
138
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136

See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–24 (2007).
Id. at 324.
Id. at 326.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 323.
Id. at 323–24.
Id.
Id.
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After years of disagreement among the circuit courts
regarding what constituted a strong inference of scienter, the
Supreme Court attempted to clarify the standard in 2007.130 On
appeal from the Seventh Circuit, the Supreme Court defined a
strong inference of scienter and offered an analytical framework
for courts to employ when determining whether it exists. The
Court defined a strong inference of scienter as one that is “at
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw
from the facts alleged.”131
Furthermore, the Court also shed light on how courts should
analyze scienter allegations.132
Many circuits took a very
individualized approach to determining whether plaintiffs
satisfied the pleading standard. The Supreme Court, however,
cautioned that it is not the court’s job “to scrutinize each
allegation in isolation but to assess all the allegations
holistically.”133 The Court instructed reviewing courts to ask this
question: “When the allegations are accepted as true and taken
collectively, would a reasonable person deem the inference of
scienter at least as strong as any opposing inference?”134 This
holistic analysis is inherently a comparative one.135 In order to
determine the strength of an inference, it is necessary to evaluate
opposing inferences.136 The inference of scienter does not need to
be irrefutable.137 It must, however, be at least as cogent as the
nonculpable explanations.138
Tellabs has the potential to affect collective scienter in two
ways. First, it addresses whether a strong inference, as defined
by the Court, can be raised without identifying an individual who
both made the statement and acted with the requisite state of
mind.
Second, it requires that allegations be reviewed
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holistically instead of individually. By requiring a holistic view
of scienter allegations, the Court is instructing lower courts to
take a more common sense approach to allegations.139
E.

Tellabs on Remand (“Tellabs II”)

On remand, the Seventh Circuit applied the Supreme
Court’s definition of strong inference and also addressed the
issue of collective scienter.140 In discussing collective scienter,
the court seemingly adopted the Fifth Circuit’s approach in
Southland.141 The court stated that, in order to establish
corporate liability for a Rule 10b-5 violation, the plaintiff must
plead scienter by looking at the state of mind of the individual
corporate official.142 It is, therefore, not sufficient to look
generally to the collective knowledge of all the corporation’s
officers and employees. At first glance, it appears that the
Seventh Circuit sounded the death knell of collective scienter.
However, the court did not close the door on collective
scienter entirely. The court went on to proffer a hypothetical
which breathes life back into collective scienter. The court stated
that a strong inference of scienter can be pled without naming a
specific corporate individual:

This analysis has become known as the “absurdity analysis.”
The absurdity analysis does not fit squarely into either the
strong or weak versions of collective scienter; the analysis is a
third, very limited, category of collective scienter. This analysis
allows for the imputation of scienter to the corporation, outside of
the traditional respondeat superior type methods.

139
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See S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2008).
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs (Tellabs II), 513 F.3d 702, 704 (7th
Cir. 2008).
141
Id. at 708.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 710.
140
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Suppose General Motors announced that it had sold one million
SUVs in 2006, and the actual number was zero. There would be
a strong inference of corporate scienter, since so dramatic an
announcement would have been approved by corporate officials
sufficiently knowledgeable about the company to know that the
announcement was false.143
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In the Wake of Tellabs

Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs, Inc. v.
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd.,144 and the Seventh Circuit’s decision
in Tellabs II, the circuit courts have not offered definitive views
of collective scienter. The general trend among the circuits has
been to acknowledge that collective scienter is possible, but to
leave the question of how to plead it unanswered.
1.

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151

153
154
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152

551 U.S. 308, 324 (2007).
549 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2008).
Id. at 739.
Id. at 739–40.
Id. at 739.
Id.
Id. at 743.
Id.
Id. at 745.
Id.
Id.
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The Ninth Circuit in Glazer Capital Management, LP v.
Magistri,145 adopted much of the Seventh Circuit’s approach in
Tellabs II. In Glazer, a company, InVision, announced that it
had entered into a merger agreement with General Electric.146
The merger agreement was a sixty-page document signed by the
CEO and COO of InVision.147 Several months later, InVision
released a press release which announced possible violations of
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.148 This announcement put the
merger in jeopardy, and caused stock prices to plunge.149
The plaintiffs alleged scienter on the part of InVision based
on a theory of collective scienter.150 The plaintiffs alleged that,
since the merger agreement contained statements assuring
compliance with all laws, the company knowingly made false
statements.151 The court found that the plaintiffs did not
adequately plead scienter.152
Since the CEO made the
statements, the plaintiffs were required to plead scienter with
respect to him;153 another employee’s knowledge of the
misstatement was insufficient.154
The court, however, recognized that collective scienter may
still be possible because it was possible to raise the required
inference of scienter with regard to a corporate defendant
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without doing so with regard to a specific individual.155 It further
cited the Seventh Circuit’s hypothetical in Tellabs II as one
instance where a corporation could be held liable through a
theory of collective scienter.156 The court stated that “there could
be circumstances in which a company’s public statements were so
important and so dramatically false that they would create a
strong inference that at least some corporate officials knew of the
falsity upon publication.”157
However, the court noted that much of its analysis was dicta,
because the facts presented by Glazer were different than the
hypothetical in Tellabs II.158 The court held that, under these
facts, the plaintiffs were required to plead that an individual
acted with scienter.159 To allow the plaintiffs to circumvent the
individualized pleading requirement under a collective scienter
theory would allow the plaintiffs to satisfy the scienter pleading
standard by showing any employee at InVision had knowledge of
the violation.160 The court held that this would be inconsistent
with the pleading requirements of PSLRA.161 However, the court
left open the question whether any circumstances exist where a
theory of collective sceinter would be proper.162
2.

United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit

155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

164
165
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163

Id. at 744.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 745.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
531 F.3d 190 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 195.
Id. at 195–96.
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The Second Circuit’s approach to collective scienter mirrors
that of the Ninth Circuit. The Second Circuit, in Teamsters Local
445 Freight Division Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc.,163 held
that while the easiest way to raise this inference is to plead
scienter to an individual defendant, it was not the only way.164
The court acknowledged that the Seventh Circuit’s absurdity
analysis was an alternate way to raise a strong inference of
scienter and, therefore, the Second Circuit implicitly adopted a
version of collective scienter.165

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 286 Side B

04/08/2016 13:04:55

FINAL_MCCABE

960

3/29/2016 3:03 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 89:939

In Dynex, the plaintiff had purchased asset-backed securities
that were secured by mortgage loans sold by the defendant,
Dynex, and its subsidiary, Merit Securities.166 After the bonds
were issued, an increasing number of borrowers defaulted on
their mortgages which caused the value of collateral to decline as
well as substantial losses for investors.167 The defendant later
disclosed that it had understated repossession rates on the
collateral, and plaintiffs filed an action for securities fraud.168
The plaintiffs named the principal executive officer of Dynex and
the CEO of Merit as defendants, along with the corporate
defendants Dynex and Merit.169 While the court held that the
plaintiffs’ complaint was insufficient to raise a strong inference of
scienter, the court did not foreclose on the possibility of pleading
a strong inference of scienter through the collective scienter
method.170
3.

United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
Struggles with Tellabs

166
167
168
169
170
171
172

174
175
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173

Id. at 192.
Id.
Id. at 193.
Id.
Id. at 196.
442 F. App’x 672 (3d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 676–77.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 678 (Ambro, J., dissenting).
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In City of Roseville Employees’ Retirement System v. Horizon
Lines, Inc.,171 the Third Circuit approved a method of imputing
liability to a corporation by pleading scienter to a specific
individual within the company. In discussing collective scienter,
like the Ninth and Second Circuit, the court implied an
acceptance of the hypothetical presented in Tellabs II.172
Ultimately, though, the court decided that the facts presented did
not raise an issue akin to the absurdity analysis.173 Therefore the
court declined to decide whether any of the approaches of
collective scienter were viable pleading methods in the Third
Circuit.174
The dissent, however, offered a strong critique of the
majority’s analysis. Specifically the dissent took issue with the
court’s individualistic approach to viewing the allegations.175 The
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Id.
Id. at 680.
178
Id.
179
Id.
180
See, e.g., Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 745 (9th Cir.
2008) (leaving the possibility of collective scienter as an open issue).
181
See, e.g., City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys., 442 F. App’x at 678 (Ambro, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the majority opinion for failing to review the allegations
holistically).
182
No. 11-1624 (JLL), 2012 WL 762311 (D.N.J. Mar. 8, 2012).
183
Id. at *20–21.
184
Id. at *20 (quoting City of Roseville Emps. Ret. Sys., 442 F. App’x at 676).
177
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dissent noted that “reviewing each allegation individually before
reviewing them holistically risks losing the forest for the
trees.”176 After conducting a holistic review of the allegations
presented the dissenting opinion found that defendants pled
sufficient facts to show that senior executives made false
statements with scienter.177 Therefore, the plaintiffs satisfied the
most basic way to impute liability to a corporation.178 Once
again, however, the dissent found it unnecessary to delve further
into collective scienter, as the facts presented did not call for it.179
The Tellabs decision, which was intended to promote
uniformity among scienter pleading, has had only a limited
impact on the theory of collective scienter.180 Some courts have
analyzed how the newly defined “strong inference” of scienter
would affect collective scienter, but few courts have considered
the effects that a holistic analysis would have on pleading
scienter through the collective scienter theory.181 In Rahman v.
Kid Brands, Inc.,182 the District Court of New Jersey analyzed
the circuit split in light of the strong inference requirement of
Tellabs and concluded that collective scienter was still a viable
theory, as long as it was confined to the limits outlined in the
hypothetical from Tellabs II.183 The court stated that “it may be
possible to plead [collective] scienter against a corporation
[but] . . . the alleged wrongdoing to so assert collective scienter
would need be ‘extraordinary.’ ”184
Rahman is also one of the few cases that begins to analyze
how a holistic approach to the scienter analysis impacts collective
scienter. While the court ultimately held that plaintiffs failed to
plead sufficient indicia of scienter for the court to apply collective
scienter, the court offered a glimpse of what would be sufficient.
The plaintiffs alleged that, since the company was issued a
warning because of its fraudulent import practices, they satisfied
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the collective scienter pleading requirement through a totality of
the circumstances test.185 The court, however, disagreed. The
court stated that a single red flag alerting the board to possible
misconduct was insufficient to plead collective scienter.186 The
amended complaint did not allege the pervasiveness of the
violations or whether executive officers would have been alerted
of them.187
III. THE CORRECT STANDARD: THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT’S
“ABSURDITY ANALYSIS”
The Seventh Circuit approach is consistent with the
language and congressional intent behind PSLRA. Furthermore,
it is also consistent with both the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
on the private right of action generally as well as the Court’s
interpretation of the scienter pleading standard in Tellabs.
A.

Absurdity Analysis Is Consistent with the Twin Aims of
PSLRA

185
186
187
188

190
191
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189

Id. at *22.
Id.
Id.
See supra part III.A.
See supra part I.B.
See supra part III.A.
See PERINO, supra note 30, at 1-8.
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The Seventh Circuit’s absurdity analysis is consistent with
Congress’s intent in enacting PSLRA.188 The purpose of PSLRA
was to dissuade frivolous litigation, while preserving meritorious
claims.189 Permitting a narrow version of collective scienter
under the Seventh Circuit’s approach will accomplish both of
these goals.190
Allowing collective scienter only in instances where it would
be absurd for corporate officials not to be aware of the
misstatements maintains a high bar for pleading standards. One
of the main critiques of collective scienter is that it will allow
plaintiffs to circumvent the heightened pleading standard and
conduct a “fishing expedition” in discovery.191 This would impose
many of the costs that PSLRA had intended to eliminate.
Collective scienter under the absurdity analysis would not
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Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Solutions, Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 366 (5th
Cir. 2004).
193
Several lower courts have implied that management-level employees must be
involved to impute scienter to a corporation, but there has not been extensive
discussion, and some courts fail to make any distinction at all. See, e.g.,
Higginbotham v. Baxter Int’l Inc., 495 F.3d 753, 757–58 (7th Cir. 2007).
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encounter this problem. Since the absurdity analysis is limited
to extraordinary situations, a flood of plaintiffs would not
overcome the pleading hurdles.
Furthermore, accepting the absurdity analysis would do
away with the distinction between strong and weak collective
scienter and many of the problems that arise with the two
theories. Hypothetical B, which matched the janitor’s knowledge
of falsity with the CEO’s statement, is the classic example of
weak collective scienter.
This example demonstrates the
potential ridiculous results that would arise from mixing and
matching one person’s state of mind with another’s statement.192
Further, the critique also highlights the problem that weak
collective scienter does not define what level of employee can be
used in the analysis.193 There is no characterization of whether
the employees must be corporate officers or management-level
employees, or whether the employee can extend all the way down
to the janitor’s office.
The absurdity analysis is not shackled by the same critiques
of weak collective scienter. First, there is no mixing and
matching of one person’s state of mind and another person’s
statement. Instead, the analysis rests upon the assumption that
there are some statements that are so dramatic, so important to
the company, that it is safe to assume that at least one corporate
official had the requisite state of mind. Second, there is no
danger of relying on a low level employee to impute liability to
the corporation. The analysis limits the assumption to corporate
officials. The absurdity analysis does not allow for one janitor to
impute liability to the entire corporation.
The critique of strong collective scienter is presented in
Scenario C. The critique centers on business efficiency. To
ensure the complete integration of all information across
international offices would be an unreasonable burden. It would
slow day-to-day business operations and would force corporations
to undertake inefficient compliance monitoring.
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The absurdity analysis, once again, is not saddled with the
same unreasonable consequences. With collective scienter, in the
context of an absurdity analysis, limited to dramatic
announcement about the company, it is not unreasonable to
require a company to take extra compliance measures to ensure
the statements they are releasing are true and accurate. Day-today operations would be minimally affected, because
announcements or disclosures that concern ordinary day-to-day
business would not be under the gamut of the absurdity analysis.
B.

Absurdity Analysis Is Consistent with Supreme Court
Jurisprudence on Private Rights of Action

194
195

197
198
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See supra Part I.C.
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See id.
See id.
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Since the early 1990s, the Supreme Court has continually
cut back on the expansiveness of the private right of action in
Rule 10b-5 causes of action.194 There is a consistent trend in
scaling back expansive doctrines that would otherwise allow
plaintiffs to plead and prove liability through less onerous
means.195 At the same time, however, the Court has never
completely quashed the private right of actions or many of the
theories underlying it.196 The Court has generally issued narrow
holdings that begin to close the door on innovative or expansive
liability methods but do not close it completely.197
Adopting a collective theory of scienter similar to the
Seventh Circuit’s approach would fit well in this pattern of
Courts could eliminate the possibility of
jurisprudence.198
circumventing pleading standards through both the strong and
weak collective scienter. This would limit the availability that
plaintiffs have in imputing liability to the corporation at the
pleading stage. However, it would not make it impossible to
plead corporate scienter through methods outside of the classic
respondeat superior method. The absurdity analysis would offer
a small doorway that could be used in mostly extreme situations
for the plaintiffs to clear the pleading hurdle.
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Absurdity Analysis Fits Squarely with the Strong Inference of
Scienter and the Holistic Approach.

D. Absurdity Analysis Applied to Scenario A
The hypotheticals from the start of this Note demonstrate
the effectiveness of the absurdity analysis.
In the first
hypothetical, a company’s marquee product had a serious
mechanical defect. The government investigation, along with the
internal reports, demonstrated that the company was aware that
the defects existed. However, prior to discovery, plaintiffs are
not able to identify exactly which corporate officers knew of the
defects.
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See S. Ferry LP, No. 2 v. Killinger, 542 F.3d 776, 784 (9th Cir. 2008).

04/08/2016 13:04:55

199

37692-stj_89-2-3 Sheet No. 289 Side A

Most importantly, the absurdity analysis fits squarely with
the Supreme Court’s decision in Tellabs, the last time the Court
has spoken on the issue of scienter. To begin, the absurdity
analysis is congruent with the definition of strong inference of
scienter. The Court defined strong inference as “at least as likely
as any plausible opposing inference.”199
When a dramatic
announcement is made by a company, it is very plausible that
corporate officers knew the statements were false. The absurdity
analysis would not apply to gray areas where there is room for
debate over what the corporate officers knew. The analysis
inherently adopts the strong inference standard because it is
limited to such absurd situations where the inference would most
likely be much more cogent than any innocent plausible
inference.
Furthermore, the absurdity analysis fits well with the
holistic scienter analysis that Tellabs described. In interpreting
the holisitic analysis, one court stated, “In assessing the
allegations holistically as required by Tellabs, the federal courts
certainly need not close their eyes to circumstances that are
probative of scienter viewed with a practical and common-sense
The absurdity analysis fits well with this
perspective.”200
commonsense perspective. When an important or dramatic
announcement is made by a company that is clearly false, it is
likely that corporate officers have knowledge of its falsity or were
deliberately reckless.
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Without any type of collective scienter, the plaintiffs would
not be able to impute liability to the corporation. The classic,
universally accepted method of imputing liability from a specific
individual would be unavailable. While the plaintiffs know the
CEO was the person who made the statement, at this point in the
litigation, they cannot determine if he was aware of the
government investigation or of the internal reports.
However, with a collective scienter theory utilizing the
absurdity analysis, the plaintiffs could survive the pleading stage
of the litigation.
When a company’s marquee product is
experiencing serious mechanical problems, it would be absurd for
corporate officers of the company not to be aware of it. Therefore,
plaintiffs would be able to successfully plead corporate liability
through the absurdity analysis of collective scienter.
CONCLUSION
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The Seventh Circuit’s absurdity analysis, which has been
generally accepted by other jurisdictions, furthers Congress’s
purpose in enacting PLSRA and is consistent with Supreme
Court jurisprudence. The pleading standard for scienter has
been a topic of debate since the enactment of PSLRA, and the
Court’s jurisprudence has not presented a clear standard for the
circuit courts to apply. Adopting the absurdity analysis will be a
substantial step in providing a uniform system of pleading
scienter in Rule 10b-5 suits. From a normative perspective, it is
important to note that the absurdity analysis will further the
broad-based goals of securities litigation. Corporations will not
be able to skirt liability through a glorified ignorance defense.
Instead, the absurdity analysis will offer an extra measure of
protection to the securities market and protect those at the heart
of all securities legislation—investors.
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